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In New Zealand as well as Australia, Canada, and the United States, the
legacy of dispossession and marginalization contributes to ongoing prob-
lems of racial and ethnic economic inequality and concentrated chronic
poverty. Despite more than twenty years of landmark treaty policy pro-
viding indigenous New Zealanders social justice and economic redress,
the majority of Maori households still have incomes well below the
national and subgroup medians. Although New Zealand has imple-
mented some of the world’s most progressive, sustained, and successful
policies for rendering reparative justice, treaty settlement has reduced nei-
ther income inequality nor the disparate rate of Maori poverty. Treaty
settlement as reparative justice successfully provides collective redress to
tribal entities that prove wrongful confiscation of tangible assets, such as
land, fisheries, forests, and treasures. Yet treaty settlement as reparative
justice provides neither adequate nor sufficient redress to most Maori
individuals or households harmed by marginalization and the lingering
legacy of dispossession. Thus reparative treaty settlement in the absence
of distributive instruments, namely targeted policy, is insufficient for rem-
edying the intertwined problems of economic inequality and chronic
poverty, particularly when national governments also undertake eco-
nomic restructuring and public sector reform.
Since signing the Treaty of Waitangi with the British in 1840, Maori
people have experienced ongoing dispossession and marginalization—the
systematic denial of full access to rights and benefits of citizenship by
either or both economic and political discrimination against indigenous
and other minorities (Gurr and Scarrit 1989). In the twentieth century,
the post–World War II economic boom not only fueled further alienation
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of Maori lands but also stimulated and accelerated urban migration,
urbanization, and detribalization (the breakdown of Maori culture by
weakening kinship links, Maori language use, and tribal customs and
practices). Marginalization not only engenders breakdown of the requi-
site values for acquiring human and physical capital, but when coupled
with detribalization also severs access to treaty settlement assets and,
thereby, social justice.
The fundamental proposition here is that all Maori are harmed by the
legacy of dispossession and marginalization and, thereby, all Maori are
entitled to social justice. The central question is what policies should gov-
ernment decision makers implement to render social justice to historically
marginalized groups. Here, my focus is not on theories of social justice;
rather, it is on the public policies implemented to render social justice and
restore equality after acknowledging breached rights. Finding mutually
satisfying answers to this question is essential not only for providing
redress to historically marginalized groups but also for governance and
for remedying racial and ethnic economic inequality and chronic poverty.
However, both the role of the state and policy mechanisms for providing
social justice remain highly contested, if not contentious, questions among
policymakers, voting majorities, and marginalized groups.
Generally policymakers pursue social justice as reparative or distribu-
tive policies that seek to ameliorate the grievances of harmed groups yet
insure minimal economic, political, and social costs to voting majorities.
Reparative justice seeks to restore harmed parties to the position they
would have held in the absence of the wrongful act(s), whereby the notion
of unjust enrichment governs the nature and amount of reparations or
compensatory damages (Miller 1991). Reparative justice is most often
(and most narrowly) applied to breached rights to property caused by dis-
possession. On the other hand, distributive justice seeks to allocate pub-
lic honors, wealth, or other rewards and penalties of society on the basis
of either merit and desert or need and equality. Distributive justice pre-
sumes equality of opportunity and that each person’s social position and
material rewards correspond as far as possible to merit (talents and
efforts). Distributive justice is applied to problems of economic need or
equality of opportunity and often employs instruments of positive dis-
crimination as targeted policies to improve the relative economic and
social position of a specific group or groups within a society. Targeted
policies provide material uplift and increased opportunities to offset the
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harm of previous discrimination or need and, thereby, move society
toward equality.
Here, I examine both reparative justice as treaty settlement and distrib-
utive justice as targeted social policy to provide social justice and analyze
the redistributive impact on Maori well-being. In addition to the Treaty
of Waitangi and the Treaty of Waitangi Acts, I briefly describe the late
1960s pantribal protest movement as well as the government’s policy
response, claims of breached treaty rights and treaty settlements, and the
problem of detribalization. The causes and outcomes of devolution and
mainstreaming Maori programs under economic restructuring and pub-
lic sector reforms—“the New Zealand Experiment”—are also identified.
In order to ascertain the redistributive impact on Maori economic and
social well-being, I analyze descriptive statistics of the entire population
to compare aggregate-level changes in incomes, labor-force participation,
and benefit receipt (in the United States, income transfers or “welfare”
payments) across population subgroups from 1976 to 1998. Government
and other archival documents are examined and primary and secondary
sources are analyzed in order to describe the historical context and iden-
tify relevant social policy issues, initiatives, and outcomes. More than one
hundred interviews were conducted with ministers of Parliament serving
on the Maori Affairs Select Committee, government officials and staff,
policy analysts, academics, and business, church, and community leaders.
The Treaty of Waitangi
On 6 February 1840 New Zealand was established as a British colony
through treaty cession achieved by means of the unilateral actions and
declarations of William Hobson, lieutenant-governor of the British set-
tlements. The treaty was written in English and Maori. Forty-six Maori
chiefs signed a Maori language translation of the treaty at Waitangi, which
subsequently was taken around New Zealand and signed by approxi-
mately five hundred additional Maori tribal representatives. The core pro-
visions of the treaty are embodied in three articles:
Article I
The Chiefs of the Confederation of the United Tribes of New Zealand, and
the separate and independent Chiefs who have not become members of the
Confederation, cede to Her Majesty the Queen of England, absolutely and
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without reservation, all rights and powers of sovereignty which the said Con-
federation or individual Chiefs respectively exercise or possess, or may be sup-
posed to exercise or possess, over their respective Territories as the sole sov-
ereigns thereof. (English text)
The Chiefs of the Confederation, and all the Chiefs who have not joined
that Confederation give absolutely to the Queen of England forever the com-
plete government over their land. (English translation of Maori text; Kawharu
1989)
Article II
Her Majesty the Queen of England confirms and guarantees to the Chiefs and
Tribes of New Zealand and to the respective families and individuals thereof
the full and exclusive and undisturbed possession of their Lands and Estates
Forests Fisheries and other properties which they may collectively or individ-
ually possess so long as it is their wish and desire to retain the same in their
possession; but the Chiefs of the United Tribes and the individual Chiefs yield
to Her Majesty the exclusive right of Preemption over such lands as the pro-
prietors thereof may be disposed to alienate at such prices as may be agreed
upon between the respective Proprietors and persons appointed by Her
Majesty to treat with them in that behalf. (English text)
The Queen of England agrees to protect the chiefs, the subtribes and all the
people of New Zealand in the unqualified exercise of their chieftainship over
all their lands over their villages and over all their treasures. But on the other
hand the Chiefs of the Confederation and all the Chiefs will sell land to the
Queen at a price agreed to by the person owning it and by the person buying
it (the later being) appointed by the Queen as her purchase agent. (English
translation of Maori text)
Article III 
In consideration thereof Her Majesty the Queen of England extends to the
Natives of New Zealand Her royal protection and imparts to them all the
Rights and Privileges of British Subjects. (English text and English translation
of Maori text)
Maori people understood the Treaty of Waitangi as a power sharing and
governance contract between two parties, Maori people and the Crown,
whereby Maori people are equal parties with the British in the cultural,
social, economic, and political life of New Zealand (Kingi 1994; Henare
1994). However, the English and Maori texts of the treaty differ pro-
foundly. According to the English text, indigenous Maori ceded “all the
rights and powers of sovereignty over their respective territories” to
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Queen Victoria. Maori people retained “full exclusive and undisturbed
possession of their lands and estates, forests, fisheries and other proper-
ties” (Article II) in return for “royal protection” and “all the rights and
privileges of British subjects” (Article III). According to the Maori text,
Maori ceded kawanatanga (governance) not sovereignty and retained
rangatiratanga (chieftainship). For Maori, this distinction is paramount.
The fundamental difference between the two texts, from the Maori per-
spective, is that confirmation of chieftainship also confirms sovereignty,
in return for a “limited concession of power.” 
Context of Contemporary Maori Protest and 
Policy Advocacy
Despite the treaty’s guarantees, and equivalent status conferred as signa-
tory party, the early experiences of Maori under British colonization were
marred by wars over land settlement and sovereignty, abrogated treaty
rights, and land confiscation and alienation. Historically, Maori political
and economic position and interests were subordinate and marginal to
the interests of Europeans.1 Even though twentieth-century policymakers
pursued policies of racial assimilation by encouraging racial intermar-
riage from the 1940s through the 1960s, the dominant ethos—the dream
of one people—was not achieved. In the watershed report by the Depart-
ment of Maori Affairs on 24 August 1960, then Acting Secretary for
Maori Affairs J K Hunn identified significant disparities between Maori
and Europeans in income, housing, and education. The report also showed
Maori landholdings substantially diminished under the 1953 Maori Affairs
and the Town and Country Planning Acts.2 In 1960 there were 3,168 land
leases covering 466,194 acres, and by 1965 the number of leases had
increased to 3,481 covering 618,580 acres; in the same period land sales
escalated from 5,245 to 51,824 acres (Schwimmer 1968, 24). By 1990
government-sanctioned land alienation had reduced Maori landholding to
only 5 percent of 60 million acres.
Therefore, the 1967 Maori Affairs Bill, which further undermined tribal
ownership, was the shot heard throughout Maoridom that galvanized
pantribal opposition and opened the door for the 1975 Treaty of Wai-
tangi Act. This bill amended the 1953 Maori Affairs Act to render it less
harmful to Maori while maintaining compulsory sale to Europeans of
land held by multiple Maori owners. Maori opposition to the bill was led
and guided by Matiu Rata (1934–1997), Labour member of Parliament
6 the contemporary pacific • spring 2000
for Northern Maori (1963–1980) and minister of Maori Affairs and min-
ister of Lands (1972–1975). Prodded by Rata, Parliament amended the
proposed bill, giving Maori incorporations greater consultation and
rights of appeal, and the options to trade shares and retain unclaimed div-
idends (Maori Affairs Amendment Act 1967). However, the enacted leg-
islation continued the compulsory sale of Maori incorporation land, but
on the basis of having “ceased to be Maori land” instead of having been
“declared European land” (Hazelhurst 1993, 46). Thus the 1967 Maori
Affairs Amendment Act ignited Maori protest. Maori leaders not only
opposed it, but accused the National party government of being openly
hostile to Maori interests and urged Maori from all tribes to actively
protest against the inequities in New Zealand society. Although united in
opposition to further alienation of Maori land and inequality, Maori
were divided on remedies and protest strategies. The Act stimulated sharp
debate among Maori leadership that pitted more conservative elders
against younger advocates, who demanded redress of Maori grievances. 
In 1968, young, urban-based, and largely university-educated Maori
formed the pantribal organization, Nga Tamatoa (the Young Warriors) to
draw attention to the Treaty of Waitangi and demand both restoration of
tribal lands and redress of grievances common to all tribes (Kingi 1994;
Te Hemara 1994). Nga Tamatoa took a militant stance in advocating the
use of Maori language as an official language, return of illegally confis-
cated lands, settlement of treaty breaches, and recognition of Maori
rights as one of the two signatory parties to the Treaty of Waitangi, the
founding document of the New Zealand state. Nga Tamatoa redefined
Maori identity by drawing on the movements for US Civil Rights, Amer-
ican Indians, and women, as well as black power ideology, and attributed
the marginal and unequal status of Maori to institutionalized white racism
and oppression (Henare 1994; Walker 1995).3 Most notably, and to the
chagrin of many, in 1971 Nga Tamatoa declared 6 February (New Zea-
land’s national day commemorating the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi)
the national “day of mourning for the loss of Maori land” and staged dra-
matic protests to publicize the plight of Maori. Even today Maori activists
still capture official New Zealand Day ceremonies, held annually at Wai-
tangi on 6 February, to call attention to Maori grievances.
By the 1970s the older generation of Maori leaders had also become
more activist in advocating the return of Maori land and Maori rights as
indigenous people and treaty party. Most prominently, Dame Whina
Cooper (1895–1994), one of Maoridom’s most distinguished and
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respected elders and former president of the Maori Women’s Welfare
League, at eighty years old led the historic 1975 Maori Land March from
Auckland to Wellington. Both the Land March and the 1977 Bastion
Point Protest and subsequent occupation were pantribal protests orga-
nized by Nga Tamatoa in conjunction with established Maori organiza-
tions representing a wide spectrum of opinions on Maori issues. Resur-
gence of Maori protest and demands for redress, equity, and social justice
also led some Maori leaders to espouse separatism and absolute Maori
sovereignty.4 Although many white New Zealanders dismiss Maori
demands for sovereignty, restoration of te tino rangatiratanga, as absurdly
radical or merely rhetoric, as did distinguished treaty scholar Paul
McHugh (1991, 49), some Maori remain quite serious in the demand for
Maori self-government. Several Maori activists maintain there is a legal
basis for Maori self-government, and some still work toward this end 
(S Jackson 1994; M Jackson 1994). However, consensus on an operative
definition of sovereignty has not been reached, and Maori demands range
from Maori self-government, to separate Maori development, to a sepa-
rate system of justice for Maori (parallel legal system).
The Government’s Response: Reparative and 
Distributive Policies
In response to heightened Maori activism in the 1960s and 1970s, the
Treaty of Waitangi was placed at the center of New Zealand governance
and policymaking. In 1975 Parliament enacted the Treaty of Waitangi
Act—legislation crafted and shepherded to passage by Matiu Rata. The
rule of contra preferentum was invoked, which holds that where a diver-
gence or ambiguity in a treaty document between two parties results, a
provision should be construed against that party which drafted the doc-
ument (Kingi 1984). The New Zealand Government accepted the tenets
of international law: “each of the parties to a treaty drawn up in two lan-
guages has the right to rely on its own version for purposes of interpre-
tation, unless there is an express stipulation that only one of the texts
shall be authoritative” (Hardy 1961). The 1975 Treaty of Waitangi Act
reasserted the importance of the Treaty of Waitangi as the founding doc-
ument of New Zealand. This act created a standing tribunal to hear
claims of breached treaty rights, investigate all new legislation from 1976
onward for possible treaty breaches by determining “the meaning and
effect of the Treaty of Waitangi as embodied in the two texts [English and
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Maori], and to decide issues raised by the differences between them”
(Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 §5[2]).5 The 1975 act established the Wai-
tangi Tribunal as a division within the Department of Justice consisting
of a chairperson (chief judge of the Maori Land Court) and up to sixteen
appointed members, and staffed by civil servants.
In 1985, the Labour government of Prime Minister David Lange
(1984–1989) amended the 1975 Treaty of Waitangi Act and greatly
enlarged its scope. The 1985 Treaty of Waitangi Amendment Act
increased the Waitangi Tribunal from three to seven members, with four
seats reserved for Maori, and made its jurisdiction retroactive to 6 Feb-
ruary 1840, the date of treaty cession. In 1988, tribunal membership was
increased to seventeen, including the chief judge of the Maori Land
Court, and the majority Maori membership requirement was removed. In
1995, the Office of Treaty Settlements (ots) replaced the Treaty of Wai-
tangi Policy Unit (which facilitated claims research and processing) and
was mandated to negotiate and implement treaty settlements. According
to Edward T Durie, then chief judge of the Waitangi Tribunal, “the Tri-
bunal’s main function is to inquire into and make recommendations to
the Crown upon claims submitted to it by Maori” (1996). The tribunal
makes findings that are not legally binding (with four exclusions) and
may make proposals for long term restoration but cannot recommend
return of land. The tribunal functions as a commission of inquiry, is not
a court, and is not bound by rules of evidence.
Treaty Settlement and Social Justice
Claims of breached treaty rights were filed almost before the ink was dry
on the Treaty of Waitangi. Although treaty-based appeals were made to
the Crown by Maori chiefs as early as 1847, the landmark settlements are
due to the Treaty of Waitangi Act of 1975 and Treaty of Waitangi Amend-
ment Act of 1985. The Treaty of Waitangi is a legal obligation between
individual iwi and hapu (tribes and subtribes) and the Crown. Claims are
filed under Article II for wrongful alienation of collectively held (tribal)
private assets, specifically, land, fisheries, forests, and other treasures. In
general, claimants seek public acknowledgment by the Crown for wrong-
doing, restoration of sovereignty over sacred sites, and redress (compen-
sation) for the illegal confiscation of private assets (or their restoration).
According to Minister of Justice and Minister in Charge of Treaty of Wai-
tangi Negotiations Doug Graham, the treaty settlements process is not
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intended to adjudicate matters of social justice or equity but to provide
fair compensation for lands, fisheries, forests, and other tangible assets
unjustly confiscated by the Crown. “Any or all Maori can bring a claim
against the Treaty of Waitangi but they must demonstrate prior owner-
ship of tangible assets” (Graham 1994).
On the question of Maori sovereignty, in a 23 November 1994 inter-
view, Minister Graham maintained that indigenous Maori ceded all the
rights and powers of sovereignty over their respective territories to Queen
Victoria and retained “full, exclusive and undisturbed possession of their
lands and estates, forests, fisheries and other properties,” in return for
“royal protection” and “all the rights and privileges of British subjects”
(Treaty of Waitangi, Articles I–III). In the minister’s view, problems of
racial and ethnic equality are “issues of economic and social justice and
are covered under Article III. As British subjects and New Zealand citi-
zens, Maori have the same rights as everybody else and deserve no spe-
cial treatment” (Graham 1994). However, at a legal conference on 10
February 1995, and after unsettling demonstrations by “radical Maori”
that disrupted Waitangi Day ceremonies, Minister Graham “took the sur-
prising step of saying New Zealand should be looking at the issue of sov-
ereignty or self-determination for Maori, an issue he had described ten
days before as irrelevant to the settlement package” (Gardner 1995, 2).
Claims of Breached Treaty Rights
Iwi-Based Claims. The government has pursued settlement of both iwi-
based (tribal) claims and complex claims on behalf of and affecting all
Maori (pantribal claims). Given the Treaty of Waitangi’s status as the
founding document of New Zealand that stipulates obligations between
individual iwi (tribes) and the Crown, treaty settlements are provided as
direct redress by means of tribal mechanisms—Maori culture. Therefore,
treaty settlements are negotiated and implemented by individual iwi.
Treaty settlements are collectively held tribal assets that are administered
by individual iwi. Tribal trust boards maintain official registers of iwi
ancestry, kinship networks, and membership. Assets and benefits from
treaty settlement are best accessed by individuals through active iwi mem-
bership, active affiliation, and strong attachment to Maori culture through
the marae. The marae is the cornerstone of Maori culture and provides
spiritual, economic, social, and political organization as well as a literally
sacred tribal meeting house. When and where treaty settlements (and
other targeted policies, such as affirmative action, biculturalism, language
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preschools, and economic development initiatives) have been most effec-
tive and successful, they have been implemented and accessed by means
of the marae structure as iwi-sponsored activities. For example, the Tai-
nui Trust Board and the Ngai Tahu Trust Board use the marae to provide
community-based educational, social, and health services and employ-
ment training to tribe members.
Old, Gifted, Crown Purchase, and Confiscation Claims. To some
extent, both the ability to prove unencumbered ownership of tangible
assets and the ability to exact settlements are products of historical acci-
dent because they also turn on the process by which land and other assets
were alienated and the level of acceptance by particular iwi in partnership
with the Crown. In the main, land was alienated by means of purchase,
gifting, and confiscation. Consequently, it is possible to file several types
of claims of breached treaty rights: as old, gifted, crown purchase (pre
and post 1865), or confiscation (raupatu) claims. Old claims are filed for
land alienated prior to British sovereignty (nzots 1996). Raupatu claims
are filed for land wrongfully confiscated as punishment of Maori tribes
who rebelled. Gifted claims are filed for land made available for “tem-
porary purchase,” to be returned when the original purchasers left, died,
or no longer used it for the purposes of the original gift.
However, particular types of claims are proving much more difficult
for some Maori tribes to litigate and settle successfully. Raupatu claims
are less complicated than gifted or pre-1865 purchase claims because the
land in question was confiscated directly by the Crown. For example,
descendants of the Waikato tribes (which historically asserted their own
sovereignty, opposed the Crown, and refused to accept the treaty) reached
a deed of settlement on their raupatu claims in May 1995, while negoti-
ations continue on the Crown purchase claims. The descendants of tribes
that accepted treaty partnership, had their lands alienated by means of
Crown purchase or gifting, and migrated to urban areas early on, also
tended to abandon their tribal ties. For example, the Muriwhenua and
Ngati Whatua tribes filed main claims on the validity of pre-1840 pur-
chases (old land claims) and smaller raupatu claims. Given the prepon-
derance of old claims and the extent of assimilation with white settlers,
Muriwhenua and Ngati Whatua encountered greater burdens of proof
and greater difficulty in achieving a tribal mandate and representation
consensus (Goodall 1997). Because Muriwhenua and Ngati Whatua tribes
exercised extensive contact and amicable relations with settlers and
Crown officials, they also experienced greater land loss and detribaliza-
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tion than more rebellious tribes—which some Maori maintain was the
price paid for partnership.
Pantribal Claims. In addition to claims filed on behalf of specific tribes,
several “pantribal” claims have been filed on behalf of “all Maori.” For
example, the Te Reo Maori Claim (Maori language claim) is a pantribal
claim filed with the tribunal on 3 May 1984. In its 29 April 1986 report,
the tribunal recommended enactment of legislation obligating the govern-
ment to use Maori language in all official business and to promote and
enable use of Maori language nationwide. Another pantribal claim,
brought by the Wellington Maori Language Board in June 1990, chal-
lenged the attempted sale of frequency-management licenses under the
Radio Communications Act 1989 (privatization of the public broadcast-
ing system). Although the tribunal completed hearings and issued an ini-
tial report on 6 June 1990 and the Radio Spectrum Management and
Development Interim Report on 26 March 1999, the “Broadcasting
Claim” remains unsettled. Another active claim, filed on 9 October 1991
on behalf of te iwi Maori (the Maori people) and still before the tribunal,
seeks to protect the use of indigenous flora and fauna, cultural and intel-
lectual property, and base resources from exploitation (eg, bioprospect-
ing and bio-engineering genetic materials). “Claims of these types account
for about one-third of all claims brought to hearing before the Waitangi
Tribunal, and an even larger number of similar claims are dealt with
before the Planning Tribunal and, more recently, the Environment Court.
Some serious judgements on the same issues have been obtained from the
High Court and Court of Appeal” (Goodall 1997).
Adjudicated Claims
By October 1998, 745 claims had been filed under the 1985 Treaty of
Waitangi Amendment Act. More than 254 claims have been adjudicated
(settled, dismissed, or withdrawn).6 Of the adjudicated claims, settlements
of most significant and most substantial economic development benefit
are the pantribal commercial fisheries claim (also known as the Sealords
Deal) and separate sets of claims by the Tainui tribes and by the Ngai
Tahu tribes. The fisheries claim was settled in September 1992 and estab-
lished the Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Commission. The initial fisheries
settlement provided a fishing quota of 30 percent and nz$150 million to
promote Maori commercial fishing and to establish ten tribally owned
companies, including Sealord Products Limited and Moana Pacific Fish-
eries. However, the schedule for asset distribution among tribal groups
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has been besieged by legal challenges. A deed of settlement was reached
with the Tainui tribe in May 1995, and provided compensation of nz$170
million, a public apology to Waikato Maori from the Queen (Crown), the
return of 14,164 hectares of land valued at nz$100 million, and a nz$65
million trust fund.
The Ngai Tahu filed the other major and significant set of claims in
1986. This set of claims is perhaps the most complex, because it involves
almost the entire South Island and sweeps nine major and diverse claims
under one umbrella.7 Although the Waitangi Tribunal ruled Ngai Tahu
claims valid and recommended settlement in 1991, a heads of agreement
only was reached on 5 October 1996 and a deed of settlement was signed
on 21 November 1997. Although the current value of the assets appro-
priated from the Ngai Tahu is estimated at more than nz$20 billion, the
terms of settlement provide, foremost, a formal public apology by the
Crown and a redress package. Redress includes but is not limited to
nz$170 million plus interest, which can be used to purchase Crown-
owned assets. The package also transfers ownership of Crown-owned
pounamu (greenstone) land, restores ownership and title to Mount
Aoraki (Mount “Cook,” which Ngai Tahu will gift back to the nation),
provides up to nz$2.5 million to settle more than thirty small ancillary
land claims, and restores other assets including reserves, mahinga kai
(food resources), and forests (ntng 1997).
Another important deed of settlement under negotiation addresses
claims by the Whakatohea tribes. Heads of agreement and deed of settle-
ment were reached in these claims. However, in July 1997 the deed of
settlement, which included a public apology and nz$40 million, was
rejected by the Whakatohea tribal council, principally because it required
the extinction of all aboriginal rights and all future claims, not exclusively
the raupatu (confiscated land) claims. More important, rejection of the
Whakatohea claim by tribal membership signaled that the negotiators
lacked both a tribal mandate and sufficient tribal support for the terms
of settlement.
The tribunal has rendered only one binding recommendation. In the
Turangi Township claim, the tribunal recommended both the return of
land transferred by the Crown to state-owned enterprises and monetary
compensation. In 1995, the tribunal reported that the claim brought by
the Ngati Turangitukua was well founded and breached several principles
of the treaty. These included the Crown’s compulsory acquisition of
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claimants’ land when a suitable site owned by the Crown and available
for the purpose existed nearby; failure to adequately compensate the
Ngati Turangitukua for their loss; and failure to return land acquired for
an industrial area as promised (Waitangi Tribunal 1998a, 2). In an ear-
lier report (1996), the tribunal had recommended that the Crown and
claimants negotiate settlement. After two years of negotiations, the par-
ties sought a binding recommendation from the tribunal. In the following
report released on 8 July 1998, the tribunal made the binding recom-
mendation that some of the Crown-owned confiscated land be returned,
and that the Crown make monetary compensation to the claimants.
However, the most prominent pantribal claim is the “fisheries claim.”
Although settlement on this claim was reached in September 1992 (Wai-
tangi Tribunal 1992b), and the Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Commission
identified a schedule for distributing settlement assets to tribes, disburse-
ment is impeded by litigation. In separate actions, several Maori organi-
zations challenged the model proposed by the Fisheries Commission to
allocate and redistribute presettlement assets. Thus far the challenges
have generated three significant appeals to the Privy Council concerning
the interpretation of the term iwi and the statutory duties of the Treaty of
Waitangi Fisheries Commission in the allocation and distribution of settle-
ment assets.
In 1994, wearied of the political and economic costs of the tribunal
process and treaty settlements, the National government of Prime Minis-
ter Jim Bolger proposed a full, final, and permanent settlement within a
prescribed period in the amount of nz$1 billion total compensation for
all outstanding claims—the Crown Settlement Proposals, also known as
“the fiscal envelope.” Beginning on 2 February 1995, a series of thirteen
regional meetings, hui, were convened by the minister in charge of Treaty
of Waitangi negotiations, Minister of Justice Doug Graham, and other
government officials to present the Crown Settlement Proposals, describe
the process of implementation, and address questions. In hui after hui,
Maori people resoundingly and with mounting outrage rejected the fiscal
envelope. After the conclusion of the 25 March 1995 hui at Christchurch,
Minister Graham canceled the remaining hui scheduled for Porirua, Wel-
lington. The government refused to amend the proposals but signaled its
intention to salvage the plan. Treaty negotiations continued amidst pro-
test, while Prime Minister Bolger, Justice Minister Graham, and officers
and staff of the Ministry of Maori Development lost considerable face.
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Social Justice as Targeted Social Policy
As they initiated reparative treaty settlement policies to provide redress,
government decision makers simultaneously introduced policies of posi-
tive discrimination targeted toward Maori development and material
uplift. Although Parliament had earlier established the Department of
Maori Affairs (dma), and later the Maori Education Foundation (1961),
to address the unique social and educational needs of the Maori, in the
1980s the government expanded Maori Affairs programs to include eco-
nomic, education, health, and social service initiatives. The government
formulated an array of policies to address Maori grievances and man-
dated implementation and administration to the Department of Maori
Affairs. For example, in 1981 the department introduced the first of sev-
eral education programs to revitalize Maori language, kohanga reo (lan-
guage nests). In October 1984, Minister of Maori Affairs Koro Wetere
(1984–1990) convened the Maori Economic Development Summit Con-
ference in Wellington, bringing Maori leaders and activists together with
government officials to identify Maori social and economic needs and
consider proposals for improving Maori well-being. The three-volume
proceedings document formed the basis for developing targeted programs,
subsequently adopted by the Department of Maori Affairs, and launched
the “Development Decade” (1984–1994). The department implemented
several new initiatives by contracting directly with Maori organizations
and enterprises to deliver programs and services to Maori people. Most
notably, these included economic development and employment training
programs such as Mana Enterprises (1986) and Maori access (1987).
The department also implemented a major health initiative to improve
Maori physical well-being and life expectancy by lowering rates of mor-
tality associated with poverty, limited information, and access to services
and treatment. Equally important, the budget authority for Maori affairs
was increased substantially, from nz$67 million to nz$250 million in
1985, in order to carry out these policies (Gardiner 1994).
The government also enacted policies of biculturalism and affirmative
action that respectively buttressed and complemented the efforts of the
Department of Maori Affairs. In 1984, the Labour government of Prime
Minister David Lange implemented biculturalism to provide Maori
greater inclusion in New Zealand society and to affirm and recognize the
special relationship between Maori and Pakeha as the two parties to the
Treaty of Waitangi. Biculturalism acknowledges the existence of both of
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these ethnic groups as founders of the New Zealand state with particular
and distinctive claims as New Zealanders (nzmmd 1986). As the signa-
tories to the Treaty of Waitangi, Maori and Pakeha have inherited moral,
political, and social obligations that require them to negotiate a relation-
ship that is equitable for both—a partnership. In 1985, policymakers
enacted the Law Commission Act, which proclaimed a new national
ethos for New Zealand—as a bicultural nation and multicultural society.
Later that year, the Department of Social Welfare (dsw) established the
Ministerial Advisory Committee for a Maori Perspective to investigate
and identify the most effective approach to meet the needs of Maori peo-
ple in policy, planning, and social service delivery; the outcome was the
pivotal document, Puao-te-Atatu/Day Break (nzdsw 1986).
In 1987, the Race Relations Conciliator introduced a comprehensive
system of affirmative actions “to improve the collective welfare of the
community by the just distribution of success and status according to the
situation faced by different groups” (rrc 1987, 90). Like its American
prototype, the system was formulated to address the unique circum-
stances and social and economic needs of Maori people as marginalized
citizens in order to attain equality of results, and affirmative action was
extended to employment, economic development, and higher education.
In the 1988 State Sector Act, government departments were further man-
dated to establish equal employment opportunity programs and publish
program plans annually. Although the State Sector Act sought equality of
outcomes, quotas and other numerical requirements were excluded.
Collision of Social Justice with Economic 
Restructuring and Public Sector Reform
In the 1980s, New Zealand policymakers enacted macroeconomic poli-
cies to restructure an ailing economy that collided with social justice poli-
cies enacted to settle Maori grievances. Prime Minister David Lange not
only implemented sweeping public sector reforms aimed at devolving gov-
ernment and stabilizing the economy, but also simultaneously amended
the Treaty of Waitangi Act and greatly enlarged its scope. The 1985 Treaty
of Waitangi Amendment Act produced a profusion of claims of breached
treaty rights, while the hundred-year-old Department of Maori Affairs
was eliminated.
In order to reverse the New Zealand economy’s downward spiral, from
1984 to 1994 successive Labour party and National party governments—
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the “new Right”—enacted radical economic and social policy reforms
that departed sharply from the long-established tradition of democratic
socialism. Upon assuming office in 1984, Labour Prime Minister David
Lange confronted a monetary crisis compounded by enormous budget
deficits and massive deindustrialization. Conservative fiscal and monetary
policies initiated in 1984 by the Labour government’s minister of finance,
Roger Douglas, were continued and extended by the National Party from
1990. By July 1994 Prime Minister Jim Bolger (1990–1997) announced
that the National government had achieved a fiscal surplus, increased
economic growth three years running (by 4.6 percent in 1994), lowered
inflation to under 2 percent, and was expected to reduce net public debt
by nearly half of gross domestic product in 1997 (down from 60 percent
to 30 percent).
Highly acclaimed by the International Monetary Fund, the New Zea-
land Experiment accomplished a budgetary and social policy revolution.
Foremost, import controls and tariffs were removed to stimulate and sta-
bilize economic growth, and private and public sector employment was
deregulated. The 1987 Labour Relations and State Sector Acts profoundly
altered employee–employer relations by limiting union organizing, and
the 1991 Employment Contracts Act abolished compulsory union partic-
ipation, effectively reorganizing work—primarily into sets of part-time
jobs at lower pay, with greatly abridged employee rights and without
health or other fringe benefits. On the fiscal side, the government intro-
duced a 10 percent goods and services tax in October 1986 (raised to
12.5 percent in June 1989), increased indirect taxes, and substantially
reduced personal tax rates for medium-to-high wage earners. The govern-
ment also authorized the sale of state-owned enterprises and other gov-
ernment assets, instituted user fees for government services previously
provided free of charge, and assessed market rates for state (public) hous-
ing, which further reduced the disposable incomes of lower-income per-
sons. Universal medical coverage was eliminated, and medical care to the
uninsured and low-income groups was rationed, while hospitals were
consolidated or closed. In short, government departments and activities
were eliminated, downsized, or reorganized.
Shifting Maori from Targeted to Universal Programs
Devolution. Prime Minister Lange’s program of devolution included
phased-out elimination of the Department of Maori Affairs in 1985 (effec-
tive 1 October 1989). The language of “devolution” was not only used to
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transfer power, resources, and responsibility to subnational or local-level
government agencies, but “devolution” also restructured the “part-
nership” between Maori people and the government of New Zealand. In
1989, the Department of Maori Affairs was replaced by the Ministry of
Maori Affairs and the Iwi Transition Agency (Ministry of Maori Affairs
Restructuring Act 1989). The Ministry of Maori Affairs provided policy
planning to the Iwi Transition Agency. Maori affairs were devolved to the
Iwi Transition Agency, which was established to acknowledge the endur-
ing traditional significance of iwi; identify the characteristics by which iwi
are to be recognized; provide for the incorporation of runanga (Maori
councils, literally tribal collectives) to represent iwi; provide a process for
the resolution of conflicts between iwi; and provide registration of iwi by
any iwi of a body corporate as the authorized voice of the iwi (Runanga
Iwi Act 1990, 2). The Runanga Iwi Act created a subnational governance
structure headed by a chief executive (general manager) that linked the
state to tribal entities and used Maori input and expertise to provide com-
munity-based programs and social services. The Iwi Transition Agency
contracted directly with iwi and other Maori tribal organizations to deliver
economic development programs and social services to Maori locally.
Both the elimination of the Department of Maori Affairs and the estab-
lishment of the Iwi Transition Agency met with strident opposition from
many Maori and further divided Maori leadership on the basis of tribal
or nontribal approaches to Maori development. Most prominently, then
National Party Minister of Maori Affairs and Minister in Charge of the
Iwi Transition Agency Winston Peters (1990–1992), promised to repeal
the Runanga Iwi Act. Although this act represented greatly improved
relations and commitment by the state, it negated Maori rangatiratanga
(chieftainship) and made iwi subordinate to the state (Cox 1993; McLeay
1991; McHugh 1991). Passage of the Runanga Iwi Act in 1990 and two
related bills—the Local Government Amendment Act (also known as Bill
No. 8, which charged runanga of each region to elect members to form
Maori Advisory Committees) and the Resource Management Act—for-
malized and established a government-recognized system of Maori polit-
ical organizations based on traditional tribal structures (iwi). Passage of
these bills also marked the state’s abandonment of its heretofore “hands-
off policy” that contributed to and fanned pan-Maori activism on treaty
and other grievances and, thereby, effectively dampened the impact of
pantribal organizations (eg, Nga Tamatoa) and neutralized the pan-Maori
movement (McLeay 1991).
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Opponents argued that these bills undermined the equal parties con-
cept inherent in the treaty by relegating Maori to a subordinate role in
policy decision making. In particular, Bill No. 8 failed to recognize that
iwi are, in their own right, autonomous, legitimate jurisdictional and con-
stitutional authorities and effectively “replace[d] the constitutional rela-
tionship of equality between Iwi and Crown, provided for in the Treaty,
with a relationship where the Iwi are subordinate and merely consulted”
(ita 1990, 37). The very definition and meaning of treaty partnership
were challenged and reinterpreted in the ensuing debate on these bills:
Was the treaty between the Crown and Maori people as a whole or
between the Crown and local tribes and extended familial groupings?
Furthermore, the debate prompted Maori to demand a voice in deter-
mining Maori policy priorities and remedies—self-determination.
The impact of colonization and later urban migration had transformed,
if not destroyed, the fabric of Maori social life and discipline (Metge 1964;
1976), and for some the solution to the ensuing problems of alienation,
anomie, and inequality rested in Maori self-help implemented by means of
kinship groupings (Mahuta 1978). The policy of devolution simultane-
ously sharpened and elevated this discourse, revealing a Maoridom com-
posed of two communities—those rooted in the traditions of te iwi, and
those transformed by cultural assimilation and urbanization. Devolution
both stanched the growing conflict between Maori pantribal and tribal
organizations over Maori affairs and highlighted differences between their
organizational goals, principles, and structures of authority (Sharp 1992,
264). However, some Maori leaders viewed devolution and the Runanga
Iwi Act as promoting the self-interest of particular Maori elites or as divi-
sive and causing competition among iwi; others regarded these initiatives
as opportunities for self-help and tribal uplift (Te Ua 1994; Cox 1993,
142). In addition to strategic differences, however, this conflict reflected
growing class differences that also underpin the detribalization debate and
litigation over the distribution of treaty settlement assets.
Mainstreaming. Under Prime Minister Bolger’s (1990–1997) National
government, and true to Minister Winston Peters’ prior pledge, in 1991
the Ministry of Maori Affairs and the Iwi Transition Agency were dises-
tablished, and programs previously delivered by these units were trans-
ferred to “main stream host agencies.” However, Winston Peters was
ousted due to differences with the National Party over the goals of Maori
policy. Consequently, John Luxton, a Pakeha, succeeded Peters as minis-
ter of Maori Affairs (1992–1996) and the Ministry of Maori Develop-
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ment (Te Puni Kokiri—tpk) was established in 1992. This new ministry’s
function was primarily passive, to provide policy advice and “to promote
increases in the levels of achievement attained by Maori with respect to
education, training and employment, health and economic and resource
development; monitor and liaise with each department and agency that
provides services to Maori” (Ministry of Maori Development Act 1991,
§5; italics in original).
Under mainstreaming, Maori policy was shifted from a two-pronged
strategy of social justice requiring both pantribal distributive and tribal
reparative mechanisms to a strategy primarily focused on providing repar-
ative justice via iwi-based mechanisms. According to Minister of Justice
Doug Graham, the objective was to mainstream Maori into universal
programs with the aim of providing social policy to Maori consistent
with Article III of the treaty, relating to citizenship benefits and privileges.
“Maori were to be treated like every body else” (Graham 1994). Hence,
targeted social and economic programs administered by Maori Affairs, as
related sets of bureaucratically coordinated initiatives, were transferred
to government departments.
Equally important, budget authority for targeted policy initiatives and
programs previously administered by the Department or Ministry of
Maori Affairs was transferred to mainstream host agencies, and staff lev-
els were cut from approximately 1,500 to 304 persons. For example,
ministry records show that nz$53.9 million allocated to the department
for Maori job training under the Maori access program was shifted to
the Ministry of Education in 1992 (nzmmd 1994). Budget authority for
administering the department, which peaked at nz$270 million in fiscal
year 1989–90, was reduced to nz$36 million in fiscal year 1993–94 for
the Ministry of Maori Development (Gardiner 1994). The Summary of
Mainstreaming shows that more than nz$121.1 million was transferred
from eleven tpk programs to other government departments in fiscal year
1992–93 (nzmmd 1994). Although this study does not permit analysis of
total budget authority shifted from Maori programs to mainstream gov-
ernment departments and agencies, it appears that total funding for
Maori programs transferred to the relevant government units exceeded
the Department of Maori Affairs’ high mark of nz$270 million.
In sum, Prime Minister Bolger’s mainstreaming policy was, de facto, a
retreat from the short-lived centralized coordination and administration
of social policy targeted to Maori people initiated under the Labour gov-
ernment. Even former Minister of Finance Ruth Richardson (1990–1994)
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later charged that the dismantling of the Ministry of Maori Affairs effec-
tively substituted the vote for Maori social policy for treaty settlement.
Perhaps more important, Maori leaders increasingly deem the Ministry of
Maori Development impotent or regard it as self-serving. Sir Peter Tapsell,
former member of Parliament (1981–1996) and Speaker of the House of
Representatives (1993–1996) acknowledged that abolishing the Depart-
ment of Maori Affairs had been a mistake. Speaking at a regional semi-
nar in Tauranga, Sir Peter said “Maoris had no faith in Te Puni Kokiri”
and called for establishment of a “stand-alone Maori Development
Department” (1998).
Impact of the New Zealand Experiment on 
Maori Social and Economic Well-Being
Unfortunately, reparative treaty settlements, in the absence of sustained
policies of distributive justice, neither narrowed the gap between Euro-
pean and Maori incomes nor offset the harm of marginalization and
detribalization. Rather, urban Maori also bear the brunt of deindustrial-
ization, economic restructuring, government downsizing, and public sec-
tor reforms. The decade of the New Zealand experiment not only
increased income inequality but also reduced Maori well-being. Although
changes in Maori well-being are evident in several measures, including
crime and incarceration, discussion here is confined to descriptive analy-
ses of changes in income, labor force participation, and benefit receipt
(poverty). Data are derived from New Zealand censuses (snz 1996a, b),
and surveys of household labor force, household expenditure and income,
and household economics (snz 1998c, 1991, 1998b, respectively). In
1996 the official population of New Zealand was approximately 3.6 mil-
lion (of whom 72 percent were European, 14.5 percent Maori, 5 percent
Pacific Islanders, and 4 percent Asian8) and the labor force exceeded 1.8
million persons.
Income
Personal income from all sources increased for all groups in the wake of
the experiment. However, the shift from “cradle to the grave” democra-
tic socialism to free market capitalism lowered real household incomes
and increased income inequality. Figure 1 shows median personal income
as a proportion of European income. Maori income fell from 85 percent
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1996. Median personal income for Pacific Islanders exceeded that of all
other groups in 1976 but fell to 74 percent of European income by 1996.
However, the drop in Asian incomes from 96 percent of European income
in 1991 to 53 percent in 1996 is most striking. According to Len Cook,
government statistician, the decline in Asian median personal income is
due largely to intercensal increase in Asian immigration between 1986,
1991, and 1996 (personal communication, 15 Sept 1998). The total Asian
population increased by 95 percent in 1986 and nearly 71 percent in 1996.
In 1996 the Asian population consisted largely of workers aged 15–44,
with incomes under nz$10,000.
Given the wide variation in household composition, I have used data
compiled by the Population Studies Centre at the University of Waikato.
These data are standardized for family size, composition, and age and
adjusted for inflation. They compare changes in the proportion of fami-
lies in each ethnic group with household incomes from all sources equiv-
alent to those in each quintile for “all families combined” in 1981, 1991,
and 1996 (table 1). From 1981 to 1991 median family incomes declined
for all groups. The proportion of Maori and Pacific Island families in the
bottom quintiles increased as Europeans shifted from lower quintiles into
higher and top income quintiles. As well, Maori families experienced
greater net losses over the decade. In 1981, 54 percent of Maori and 38
percent of European families were in the two bottom income quintiles,
while 10 percent of Maori and 21 percent of European families were in
the top income quintile. By 1991 the number of Maori families in the bot-
tom quintiles rose to 61 percent, while Maori families in the top quintile
declined to 8 percent. However, Europeans fared better, as families in the
bottommost quintiles fell to 34 percent, while families in the three high-
est quintiles increased. In 1996, 61 percent of Maori families still have
incomes below the median for Maori, while 56 percent of Pacific Islanders
and 34 percent of Europeans had incomes below their respective group
medians. Not only are more Maori falling out of the middle and upper
income brackets, but the gap between Maori and European family
incomes widened from nz$17,051 in 1991 to nz$20,729 in 1996.
Labor Force Participation
In order to explain differences in income, I examined the qualitative as
well as quantitative character of labor force participation in New Zea-
land.9 The New Zealand labor force comprises all resident persons aged
fifteen years and over, who work twenty or more hours per week full or
Table 1. Proportion of Each Ethnic Group with Incomes Equivalent 
to Income Quintiles for All Families Combined in 1981, 1991 
and 1996. (Percentages)
Family Income Quintiles Median 
Family Income*
Bottom Fourth Third Second Top ($)
1981
European 19 19 20 20 21 48,229
Other 21 20 18 21 21 47,133
Maori 30 24 19 16 10 36,590
Pacific Island 29 27 19 19 6 35,804
All Families 46,809
1991
European 15 19 20 21 24 38,458
Other 22 19 19 19 21 34,333
Maori 42 19 17 13 8 21,407
Pacific Island 39 24 19 12 6 22,106
All Families 34,776
1996
European 15 19 21 22 23 49,424
Other 32 23 16 14 15 32,803
Maori 39 22 17 14 8 28,695
Pacific Island 32 25 21 15 7 32,278
All Families 41,011
Percentage Change, 1981–1996
European –0.3 .01 0.6 0.5 –0.8 +2
Other –11.4 4.4 –3.61 –4.2 –6.8 –44
Maori –3.3 3.0 –0.3 1.0 –0.4 –28
Pacific Island –6.8 1.5 1.1 3.0 1.3 –11
All Families –14
Source: Derived from Martin 1995, 8, 17; personal communication July 1998.
*Income data are standardized for age and household composition and size, and
adjusted for inflation in March 1996 New Zealand dollars.
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part time, and includes persons still in school. In 1996 nearly 51 percent
of all workers aged 15–59 years who were employed full time had eleven
years or less education, and 24 percent left school without qualifications.
Figure 2 shows that aggregate labor force participation decreased for all
groups over the course of the New Zealand experiment. Rates of labor
force participation for European males declined, though unevenly, from
1976 to 1993 and rose to 75 percent by 1998. Maori males experienced
greater decline than all other male groups. Falling labor force participa-
tion shifted Maori employment from the highest to the lowest for all
groups, from 82 percent in 1976, to 69 percent in 1994 and 72 percent
in 1998. Rates for both Pacific Island and Maori males were roughly
equal over the period, falling from 82 percent in 1987 to 72 percent in
1998. In 1976 labor force participation for European males was lower
than for Maori males at 73 percent. However, from 1989 to 1998 the rates
for European men exceeded those of Maori and Pacific Island males, dur-
ing and after the reforms, averaging 75 percent. (To some extent, this
trend also reflected changes in immigration policy governing guest work-
ers, largely Pacific Islanders, who must have employment in order to
reside in New Zealand.)
Labor force participation rates did not increase for all female sub-
groups over time. Labor force participation was substantially higher for
Pacific Island females than for all other female ethnic groups in 1987, at
59 percent, fell to 49 percent in 1993, and rose to 56 percent in 1998.
Similarly, the rates for Maori females fell from 53 percent in 1987 to 49
percent by 1993, but increased to 56 percent in 1998. Labor force par-
ticipation rates for European females remained stable over the entire
period, averaging 54 percent from 1987 to 1996 and 58 percent there-
after.
Occupations. In years just prior to the reforms, the labor market tended
to be unsegmented and the labor force was largely working class. The
labor force was dominated by unskilled blue-collar workers concentrated
in primary production and agricultural occupations (table 2). Workers
shared similar levels of education, and earnings differences were smaller
among workers with eleven years or less schooling in 1976 than in later
years, or for workers with tertiary or higher education in all years (Lash-
ley 1999, 56). (Primary production workers enjoyed greater pay parity
than workers in other occupations, given stringent union regulation.)
Analysis of census data on educational characteristics of the labor force
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workers had eleven years or less education, and 52 percent left school
without qualifications in 1981.10 Workers in all age and ethnic groups
vastly improved their levels of educational attainment between 1981 and
1996. School leaving without qualifications fell significantly, by 27 per-
cent for Europeans, 35 percent for Maori, 42 percent for Pacific Island-
ers, and 34 percent for Asians. In 1996, 47 percent of the labor force had
eleven and more years schooling—tertiary or higher education.
Table 3 shows that from 1971 to 1986 more than 72 percent of the
entire New Zealand labor force was concentrated in occupations related
to agriculture and production. Not only did a preponderance of Maori
and Pacific Island workers hold jobs in these occupations, but the major-
ity of European workers in 1971 also held unskilled jobs in agriculture
(males 14 percent; females 5 percent) and production (males 46 percent;
females 17 percent). The total number of male workers in agriculture and
production fell to 51 percent in 1991 and to 47 percent by 1996, while
males in professional and technical occupations doubled, from 10 percent
in 1971 to 20 percent in 1996. However, despite vast gains in education,
Maori and Pacific Island workers remained concentrated in agriculture
and production-related occupations.
Furthermore, Asian immigration and the reforms are transforming the
New Zealand labor market. In the 1996 census, New Zealand statisti-
cians discerned rudiments of labor market segmentation.11 For the first
time in New Zealand history, government statisticians found a “broad
occupational split,” with European and Asian ethnic groups, excluding
Cambodians and Vietnamese, “most likely to work in professional and
white collar occupations while people from New Zealand Maori and
Pacific Island groups are most likely to work in blue collar and unskilled
occupations,” primarily as trades workers, plant and machine operators,
and assemblers (snz 1998a, 7).
Unemployment. Data on unemployment rates are available for all pop-
ulation subgroups only from 1987. In response to shifts in the economy
and deindustrialization, total unemployment rose from the low of 4.1
percent in 1987 to 11.1 percent in 1993 and declined to 6.8 percent by
March 1998 (figure 3). Unemployment rose most markedly for Pacific
Islanders, from 6 percent in 1987 to the high of 29 percent in 1992, slow-
ing to 25 percent in 1993, and falling to 15 percent in 1996 and holding.
(This drop may be attributed to many Pacific Islanders’ status as guest
workers who return to their islands of origin after plant closings and job
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Maori rose from the 1987 low of 11 percent to a high of 26 percent in
1992, gradually fell to 15 percent by 1996, and rose slightly to 18 percent
in 1998. Europeans experienced significantly lower rates of unemploy-
ment over the period: 3 percent in 1987, 7.9 percent in 1993, and an aver-
age of 4.4 percent thereafter. Asian unemployment rose over the period,
from the lowest for all groups, 4 percent in 1987, to 13 percent in 1998.
Benefit Receipt
Collecting data on poverty trends in New Zealand is more nettlesome
because the government eschews the logic of an official poverty line and
does not release raw census data, which would permit computation of
one. Furthermore, the Department of Social Welfare records of benefit
receipt and ethnic origin are not maintained consistently over time. When
ethnic origin is recorded, applicants are not asked or encouraged to iden-
tify race or ethnicity. Instead, racial identification is an item that appears
on benefit applications in some years and not in others. When the item
appears on applications, response is voluntary. Because the Department
of Social Welfare does not maintain reliable or consistent data on benefit
receipt by ethnicity, Statistics New Zealand derives these data from
responses to “sources of income” questions in the Household Expendi-
ture and Income Survey and in response to question 14 on the Census of
Population and Dwellings: “Which types of income support have you
received during the last 12 months?” Four caveats are important when
analyzing the data on benefit receipt:
• The range of benefits and their eligibility criteria have changed over
the last decade. For example, the universal family benefit was
phased out and replaced by the means tested family support benefit,
an income supplementing benefit. The domestic purposes benefit, an
income replacement benefit for single parents and older women, was
reduced.
• Benefit receipt is subject to over- and under-reporting.
• Respondents may receive several benefits, either sequentially as their
situation changes or simultaneously (eg, family support and domes-
tic purposes benefit).
• Some benefits are intended as total replacements for income (domes-
tic purposes and unemployment), while others are supplements to
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Until 1985, all benefits were made as income transfer payments under a
universal scheme with thirteen categories: widows; orphans; unsupported
child; age (until 1976); family (abolished 1990); domestic purposes (ini-
tiated 1975); income support; superannuation; unemployment; invalid;
sickness; supplementary; and emergency assistance (abolished 1974). In
1986 nine categories were redefined as means tested on the basis of inad-
equate income (spa 1993, 12–13). The need-based income support bene-
fit (which paid nz$6,907 for a single adult without dependents and
nz$11,511 for married adults) placed income support recipients (dispro-
portionately more Maori) in the lowest income quintile in 1993. Super-
annuation is the most generous benefit, paying 80 percent of the gross
average wage to married couples and 60 percent to single persons aged
59 and older. In 1986 superannuation averaged annual payments of
nz$16,180 (one person) and nz$30,436 (two persons) and placed super-
annuitants in the second income percentile.
Data show significant changes in benefit receipt over the decade. In fig-
ure 4 total benefit receipt for Maori and Europeans was within a single
percentage point in 1981 (13.1 percent and 12.1 percent respectively).
Benefit receipt is significantly lower for Pacific Islanders (6.5 percent) than
other groups, consistent with macroeconomic trends and immigration
policy governing guest workers and immigrants. However, benefit receipt
increases and diverges in 1986, rising to 17 percent for Maori and 13 per-
cent for Europeans, while falling slightly for the other groups. Despite cuts
in welfare spending, and consistent with shifts in the New Zealand econ-
omy, total benefit payments to unemployed workers increased by 20 per-
cent between 1989 and 1990. By 1991, benefit receipt not only increased
among all groups but became more disparate, rising to 15 percent for
Europeans, 31 percent for Maori, and 23 percent for all others.
When the data for benefit receipt are disaggregated, not only are the
expected differences by age, gender, and ethnicity illuminated, but they
increase in the wake of the New Zealand experiment. According to the
Department of Social Welfare, in 1991, of the 2.5 million persons aged
15 and over resident in New Zealand, 45 percent received some type of
benefit payment; of those, 44 percent were males and 65 percent females.
Due to population subgroup differences in age composition and life
expectancy, a greater proportion of Maori received income support ben-
efits (40 percent) and far fewer survived to collect superannuation in
1992. (Of those aged 60 and older, Europeans make up 17 percent of the
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lies with children, 44 percent are single parent families; corresponding
figures are 32 percent for Pacific Islanders, and 18 percent for Europeans.
In 1994, more than half of total welfare benefits were allocated to super-
annuation (53 percent), while 15 percent went to unemployment, 13 per-
cent to domestic purposes, 8 percent to sickness and invalids, and the
remaining 11 percent to all other categories (nzdsw 1994).
Table 4 shows how the composition of benefit receipt changed over the
decade. Foremost, the number of persons receiving two or more benefits
increased significantly for all groups. Most women receive income sup-
port under the family support benefit, and a greater proportion of Maori
women are dependent on income support benefits than either Pacific
Islanders or Europeans. Similarly, among male recipients, a greater pro-
portion of Maori receive income support than do Pacific Islanders or
Europeans. However, Maori males primarily receive income support as
unemployment benefits, whereas European males primarily receive fam-
ily support benefits. This trend may reflect sequential effects of benefit
receipt, where more Europeans shift from the unemployment benefit to
the family support benefit or shift from unemployment into part-time
work at minimum wages in combination with the family support benefit.
Moreover, a preponderance of Maori work in seasonal employment, such
as sheep shearing and harvesting, which subjects them to spells of
employment and cycles of unemployment. Most important, the value of
the standard benefit rate declined substantially, from 59 percent in 1976
to 42 percent of weekly average net wages in 1994. In other words, in
1994 persons entirely reliant on the standard income support benefit lived
on less than half of the gross average wage before taxes—nz$238.52. In
sum, benefit receipt significantly determines trends in household incomes,
especially for Maori and Pacific Islanders.
The Limits of Treaty Settlement 
and the Problem of Detribalization
Declining real incomes and rising poverty among Maori, concurrent with
achieving deeds of settlement with substantial redress packages, have
rekindled the debate over the redistribution of treaty settlement assets.
Comparative analyses of census data show that Maori constitute a dis-
proportionate share of New Zealand’s urban poor. Forty-four percent of
Maori are on the “dole” and New Zealand’s new “urban underclass”
exhibits many of the same characteristics and pathologies as the American
lashley • social justice and detribalization 35
urban underclass—impoverished minority families concentrated in eco-
nomically distressed neighborhoods. Most Maori (and Pacific Islanders)
reside in urban areas with high rates of poverty, joblessness, teenage preg-
nancy and out-of-wedlock births, school leaving without certification,
and crime. Increasingly, Maori youth are estranged from Maori culture
and alienated from New Zealand society. Many Maori (and Pacific
Island) youth strongly identify with African American youth and con-
sciously emulate their “black brothers and sisters.” Some Maori youth
even define their alienation and marginalization in “gangsta rap” and
“white racism” terms. More sobering is the increased despair among
Maori (and Pacific Island) youth reflected by growing crime, violence,
school leaving, chronic drug use (largely glue sniffing), and suicide.
Unfortunately, the economic benefits from treaty settlement assets may
be beyond the reach of individual Maori and have limited trickle-down
capacity for reversing the decline in Maori household incomes and off-
setting the pathologies of poverty. Rather, as redress for illegal confisca-
tion of private assets collectively held, treaty settlement assets are not
intended for distribution as trickle-down social welfare.
In order to assist impoverished Maori concentrated in distressed urban
areas, some Maori have formed urban Maori authorities to provide com-
munity-based economic development and social welfare services.12 Te
Whanau O Waipareira Trust (the Waipareira Trust), based in West Auck-
land, and the Manukau Urban Maori Authority Incorporated (muma) in
South Auckland, are urban Maori authorities that deliver social welfare
services to Maori and are funded, in part, by the government via the
Community Funding Agency (cfa). This agency is a unit within New
Zealand’s Social Welfare Agency that contracts with providers to deliver
health, employment training, and other social services directly to citizens
in their communities. Funding to the agency was reduced substantially
during the decade of social welfare and public sector reforms. In turn,
funding to urban Maori authorities was also cut, and the Waipareira
Trust legally contested the cuts. According to John Tamihere, chief exec-
utive officer of the Waipariera Trust, “Maori are 35 percent of the West
Auckland population and the Trust is the only Maori provider of services
targeted to Maori people in this community. The Trust received 17 per-
cent of total cfa funding allocated to West Auckland in 1992 and only
14 percent in 1993” (1994). In an effort to have funding restored, the
trust filed with the tribunal a claim of breached treaty rights under Arti-
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resenting the West Auckland community and that the Crown, by reduc-
ing funding to the trust, had failed to recognize both the representative
and the trust status of the Waipareira Trust as a treaty partner.
The urban Maori authorities also seek social justice and compensation
on behalf of “detribalized” Maori and have filed “pantribal” court
appeals challenging proposals to redistribute treaty settlement assets via
iwi mechanisms. Alleging that most Maori are urban, some authority
leaders contend that many urban Maori are detribalized and that detrib-
alization militates against social justice and the fair and equitable distrib-
ution of treaty settlement assets among all persons of Maori descent. John
Tamihere and June Jackson, chief executive of muma, maintain that many
urban Maori do not engage in iwi activities and do not embrace Maori
tribal customs via the marae. Both officers also assert that detribalization
constrains many urban Maori from obtaining redress and social justice
for the legacy of dispossession and marginalization caused by the Crown’s
abrogation of Article III treaty rights (Jackson 1994; Tamihere 1994).
Yet leaders of Maori tribal organizations vigorously refute these alle-
gations and arguments, challenging both the extent of detribalization and
the logic of distributing tribally held private settlement assets to persons
who are not affiliated with the tribe. Settlement assets provide redress to
descendants of Maori wrongfully harmed by the Crown’s abrogation of
Article II treaty rights and, thereby, offer tribal collectives the promise of
substantial economic development benefit as well as sovereignty over
sacred sites. Treaty settlement is an effective and important group mech-
anism for providing social justice and redress. Only Maori who are affil-
iated with the particular iwi named in specific treaty settlements are enti-
tled to share in settlement assets, because assets derive from the unjust
confiscation of private tribal assets. In order to share the benefits of treaty
settlements, individual Maori—urban and rural—must provide proof of
tribal affiliation.
Foremost, tribally affiliated Maori maintain that if a person of Maori
descent is truly detribalized (unable, unwilling, or otherwise too alienated
to demonstrate tribal affiliation), then by definition, that person cannot
share in the benefits of treaty settlements negotiated by the tribe as
redress for illegal confiscation of tribally held private assets. Leaders of
tribal entities also contest estimates of the actual numbers of Maori who
are said to be detribalized and the extent to which detribalization occurs.
Rather, many Maori who are active in tribal matters contend that the
great majority of Maori actually are affiliated with iwi, Moreover, this
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view is substantiated by recent census data. According to the census, in
1991 approximately 71 percent of Maori identified affiliation with at
least one tribe, while in 1996 the number increased to 74 percent. Oppo-
sition to the detribalization notion is perhaps best articulated in a recent
communication from a former member of the Waitangi Tribunal.
There is dispute, much of it quite artificial, about just how many “urban
Maori” are in fact “unaffiliated” or “do not know” their tribal connection,
or are truly “unable” to find out. Available statistics and factual evidence indi-
cates a quite small number. . . . No doubt there will be at least a few who
know they are Maori but do not know their proper tribal connections. . . .
there is a duty on the individual to make an effort to contact their tribal
authority, as well as a duty on the Tribe to seek out its members and to assist
them, wherever they are living. . . . The majority of people who are urban def-
initely do know their tribal rights, and how to go about tribal business of all
kinds even if they are in the city.
Also it must be recognized that most Maori are tribal, and that “tribal”
describes a huge range of things [from] intense involvement in tribal life and
traditional activities . . . to once a week, monthly, maybe only at the annual
tribal hui [meeting] . . . by attending a funeral, wedding or family reunion, or
. . . a trip home from Australia or London. Even those who haven’t been home
for years still know their tribal connections and carry that with them every-
where. Of course there are many problems with this, especially for the chil-
dren, but Maori people, and their tribal organizations, are acutely aware of
them all, and do what they can with limited resources to keep alive their cul-
ture and identity. . . . If truly detribalized, you cannot participate in a treaty
settlement, because that belongs to a tribe. (Former tribunal member, personal
communication, 11 Nov 1997)
Many proponents of the detribalization thesis and pantribal or nontribal
strategies for distributing treaty assets overlook the critical distinction
between the redress due Maori collectives for the wrongful and illegal
confiscation by the state of collectively held private assets under Article II
and the redress due individual Maori for the deprivations—dispossession
and marginalization—caused by breached citizenship rights under Article
III. Exactly what are the government’s obligations in providing redress
and social justice to Maori as individuals (or households) for breached
treaty rights under Article III, as benefits and privileges of citizenship?
According to the former member of the tribunal,
Treaty settlements actually involve the return to Maori people collectively of
assets, and thence income, assets that always belonged to them but were
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wrongly taken away or withheld by the State hitherto because of breaches of
the Treaty, and usually of outright illegality under ordinary Law as well. This
important distinction needs constant assertion, because many people fail to
notice that “Treaty settlement assets, or income” represent private property,
albeit communally held, and not any kind of State or public funds, and there-
fore [are] not expected to pay for costs of State programs or for the duties of
the State towards its citizens under welfare legislation or the like. This is the
most obvious flaw in the contentions of Waipareira and muma. Government
in the past has often in fact diverted the property of others (Maori citizens and
their tribal collectives) to serve Governments’ own purposes, usually against
the interests and desires of the true owners. It is a modern tragedy that we
now have Maori individuals trying to do the same thing.
Providing social justice and equity is the responsibility of Government, not
the tribal authorities. If welfare organizations, such as the umas, need further
resources, funds ought to be provided by Government, not taken from private
or tribal collective estates. This of course does not rule out the possibility, per-
haps even the likelihood, that iwi collectives might very well decide to make
donations in that direction of their own free will, or that iwi might decide to
contract some uma, or other city agencies to provide certain services to their
membership in a city area. Major difficulties arise from attempts by certain
Maori individuals to take away tribal assets by political or legal force, and
then apply the fruits to various government programs that they happen to be
in charge of administering. (Former tribunal member, personal communica-
tion, 11 Nov 1997)
Pantribal Challenges to the Allocation and 
Distribution of Treaty Settlement Assets
The problem of detribalization has rekindled passionate debate and con-
flict within Maoridom over the allocation and distribution of treaty set-
tlement assets. Although some New Zealanders allege that the dispute is
being waged by a few Maori individuals seeking to appropriate treaty set-
tlement assets to fund their own organizations, the path to asset distrib-
ution has been impeded by legal wrangling and litigation since settlement
of the fisheries claims in 1992.
For example, the ongoing battle over allocating and distributing fish-
eries settlement assets involves assets currently estimated at nz$700 mil-
lion. In September 1992, the Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Commission
was charged to allocate pre-settlement assets of nz$200 million to Maori
people, and subsequently litigation ensued over whether assets should be
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divided on the basis of tribal population or coastline. Leaders of urban
Maori authorities maintain that “many Maori now live not in the old
tribal areas with which iwi are associated, but in town; and it has been
claimed on behalf of these ‘urban Maori’ that allocation to iwi would not
provide for them any or any proper share of the benefit to be distributed
under the allocation by the Commission of pre-settlement assets to iwi”
(cpc 1997, 4).
Therefore, leaders undertook a series of legal actions to enable Maori
to transfer their individual share of iwi settlement assets to the urban
organizations that deliver services to them. In March 1995, the Manukau
Urban Management Authority and the Waipareira Trust initiated a High
Court challenge to the Fisheries Commission’s proposals for distributing
settlement assets to iwi. In July 1995, the tribes supporting either of the
coastline or population models of allocation agreed to work together and
formed the Treaty Tribes Coalition. In August 1995, the High Court
decided that the Waitangi Tribunal could not consider the allocation of
fisheries assets. In April 1996 the Appeal Court of New Zealand not only
upheld the High Court decision that the Waitangi Tribunal could not
consider the allocation of fisheries assets, but further ruled that urban
Maori have a right to share in the fisheries settlement assets. In June
1996, the Treaty Tribes Coalition, Muriwhenua, Tainui, and Ngati Porou
appealed the August decision to the Privy Council.
In the Muriwhenua appeal, the judgment rendered by Lord Robin
Cooke of Thorndon in the Court of Appeal held “the most important
point to be made at the outset of our present judgement is that the deed
of settlement was conceived as a pan-Maori settlement of fisheries claims.
It was not for the benefit of selected groups of Maori only” (cpc 1997,
15–16). The appeal decision turned on the use and meaning of the Maori
word iwi. The term, as introduced in the 1975 Treaty of Waitangi Act, is
said to refer to “the Queen’s subjects already living on the land and oth-
ers yet to come.” Iwi is defined as “nation people” (not tribe) and the
word hapu is used to refer to tribe or subtribe. Judge Cooke ruled that
the “Deed of Settlement of all the commercial fishing rights and interests
of Maori is ultimately for the benefit of all Maori” (nzca 1996, 27).
The central problem here is one of apportionment. In the initial deed
of settlement, the Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Commission was estab-
lished in 1992 to facilitate development of Maori fisheries enterprises and
to manage fisheries assets. In addition to 10 percent of the national fish-
ing quota (“presettlement assets”), the commission acquired a further 26
42 the contemporary pacific • spring 2000
percent, through a 50 percent shareholding in Sealord Products Limited
and the rights to 20 percent of all quota for any further species of fish
bought within the quota management system, as well as other cash assets
held by the commission (post-settlement assets). The fundamental ques-
tion is how to apply both categories of assets for the benefit of all Maori.
This issue arises because the Fisheries Commission proposed to redistrib-
ute assets based on coastline, mana whenua, mana moana (authority over
the land carries authority over the sea). Thereby, one model of allocation
would give a coastal tribe(s) all the quota for the inshore fishery adjacent
to its coast and 50 percent of the corresponding deep-water quota, the
remainder to be divided among tribes according to population. Accord-
ing to Judge Cooke, this model would unfairly advantage a tribe such as
Ngai Tahu because of the very long South Island coastline, while it would
unfairly disadvantage inland tribes or tribes with less coastline, such as
Muriwhenua (nzca 1996, 27).
In the April 1996 decision, the court held that “the annual lease rounds
have resulted in Ngai Tahu receiving the lion’s share of settlement bene-
fits hitherto” (nzca). Judge Cooke ruled that “iwi refers, as we have said,
to the people of tribes; and this must include those entitled to be mem-
bers although their specific tribal affiliation may not have been and even
cannot be established. They are among those entitled to benefit from pan-
Maori settlement. Natural justice requires that as far as reasonably
practicable they be consulted by the Commission” (nzca 1996, 29). The
Fisheries Commission was further charged to formulate a model that
apportioned fisheries assets to benefit all Maori, tribally affiliated and
nonaffiliated. The central issue turned on the definition and meaning of
iwi and on the question of whether urban Maori authorities were iwi.
Although there was extensive debate on this question, on 16 January
1997, the judgment of the Lords of the Privy Council “pre-empted the
function of the Commission on the point of [a] separately administered
provision for urban Maori.” The Privy Council declined to interfere but
chose to “advise Her Majesty that appeals on this point ought to be
allowed . . . and the matter remitted to the trial judge for further hear-
ing” (cpc 1997, 12).
Thus the 16 January 1997 judgment of the Privy Council delivered by
Lord Goff of Chieveley overturned the Appeal Court ruling and sent the
issue back to the High Court. On 6 July 1998, the Waitangi Tribunal
issued its findings that “non-tribal Maori groups may be entitled to spe-
cial consideration in terms of the Treaty. . . . they should not be treated
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simply as another interest group under the Treaty’s equal citizenship pro-
visions” (Waitangi Tribunal 1998b). In addition, the tribunal maintained
that the treaty is a “living document” directed to Maori interests gener-
ally, not merely as classes of property interests, and is not limited to tribes
but applies to a variety of situations. However, the Crown counsel’s argu-
ment held sway, “that rangatiratanga is guaranteed protection only in
Article II of the Treaty, and it only applied in respect of the control of
properties by iwi and hapu. . . . since Waipareira was not a traditional
tribe or iwi with customary lands and fisheries, it could not exercise
rangatiratanga, and its membership had no rights other than citizenship
rights” (Waitangi Tribunal 1998b). On 4 August 1998 Justice Paterson of
the High Court in Auckland ruled in favor of “defining iwi as being a tra-
ditional Maori tribe and supported traditional tribes distributing fisheries
assets” (Wellwood 1998, 1). Justice Paterson also ruled that “the Wait-
angi Fisheries Commission had a duty to ensure that any scheme allocat-
ing fisheries assets had to cater adequately for all beneficiaries of the set-
tlement” (Wellwood 1998, 1). Thus the pendulum of social justice
continues to oscillate between reparative and distributive instruments.
Conclusion
From the 1970s to the 1990s, the government used two strategies to
address Maori grievances: targeted social policy and reparative treaty set-
tlement. New Zealand policymakers committed substantial resources and
good faith to the improvement of Maori economic and social well-being
by means of targeted programs via the Department of Maori Affairs and
by providing redress for breaches of the Treaty of Waitangi via the Wait-
angi Tribunal. Before targeted social policies could take hold and be eval-
uated, however, macroeconomic exigencies collided with social justice.
The government devolved targeted programs, cut social welfare, and
mainstreamed Maori into universal programs irrespective of lingering
effects of dispossession and marginalization.
Increasingly, many scholars, analysts, and politicians acknowledge that
New Zealand’s decade of budgetary and social policy reforms not only
exacerbated poverty among the least advantaged but also rendered New
Zealand a far less egalitarian society than it had been (Kelsey 1995; Mar-
tin 1995; Rowntree Foundation 1995; Mowbray and Dayal 1994). Unlike
those in the United States, problems of poverty in New Zealand generally
were not deemed intractable, racial, or ethnic. Although a relatively small
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number of better educated (3.4 percent in 1991; 7.7 percent in 1996) and
tribally affiliated Maori prospered over the decade, the number of impov-
erished Maori also increased significantly, by 11 percent.
Furthermore, expansion of the top and bottom income quintiles has
sharpened class differences between Maori elites and the working class
and revealed a Maoridom that is neither monolithic nor homogeneous.
Rather, class differences over aspirations, goals, and means for Maori peo-
ple are at the center of discourse on detribalization, legal challenges over
distribution of treaty settlement assets, and debate over the government’s
pursuit of pantribal versus iwi-based approaches to Maori policy. In
March 1995, the Labour party soundly criticized the effects of the reforms
on the poor. Opposition leader Helen Clark repudiated the public sector
reforms and characterized them as “the Americanization of New Zea-
land” because they demonstrated the National government’s “preference
for a booming economy at the expense of social justice with the attendant
creation of a permanent underclass without any hope of getting out”
(Clark 1995).
Thus far, treaty settlements have neither improved economic and social
well-being among the majority of Maori households nor offset the impact
of the reforms. In fact, very few deeds of settlement have reached the asset
disbursement stage. Treaty settlement assets were neither conceived nor
intended for distribution as trickle-down social welfare. Rather, treaty
settlements render reparative justice to tribes, whereas equity and equal-
ity require distributive justice by means of positive discrimination. Treaty
settlement assets are distributed to Maori tribal collectives—iwi and
hapu—and managed by tribal trust boards, generally, as commercial ven-
tures and investment portfolios. Limited benefits are provided directly to
individual Maori and then principally as educational grants and tertiary
and university scholarships to Maori students who acknowledge iwi affil-
iation and participate in iwi activities. Although tribal trust boards pro-
vide limited social services, the objective is not to supplant government
responsibility.
In conclusion, the debate over detribalization and asset redistribution
is rooted largely in confusion over collective and individual redress for
breaches of Articles II and III of the Treaty amid the declining economic
and social well-being of Maori households. Furthermore, the debate
leaves unresolved the two questions, raised but left wanting during devo-
lution and mainstreaming, that remain at the center of current ligation
over allocation and distribution of treaty settlement assets today. Is the
treaty between the Crown and Maori people as a whole or is it between
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the Crown and local subtribes and extended familial groupings—te
runanga iwi? What are the government’s obligations in rendering redress
and social justice to Maori as individuals (or households) for breached
treaty rights under Article III, as benefits and privileges of citizenship?
The issues raised by the detribalization debate and pantribal challenges,
as well as the redistributive problems they seek to resolve, demonstrate
that the contemporary situation of Maori is not exclusively a problem of
abrogated treaty rights and sovereignty. Increasing inequality between
Maori and Europeans is also exacerbated by deindustrialization, eco-
nomic restructuring, and public sector reforms, as well as the legacy of
dispossession and marginalization. Therefore, social justice also requires
distributive mechanisms targeted to all Maori people, tribally affiliated
and nonaffiliated, to provide redress for breaches of Article III, in addi-
tion to reparative mechanisms to settle breaches of Article II.
*  *  *
This study was facilitated by generous support from the United States
Fulbright Program, the Governmental Studies Division of the Brookings Institu-
tion, Howard University’s Center for Urban Progress, and the Center for the
Study of Urban Inequality in the Harris Graduate School of Public Policy Stud-
ies at the University of Chicago. I am enormously indebted to many New Zea-
land entities and their staffs, in particular the New Zealand–United States Edu-
cational Foundation, the Alexander Turnbull Library in Wellington, the Ministry
of Maori Development, the Dictionary of New Zealand Biography, the Maori
Statistics Forum, and Statistics New Zealand.
Notes
1 Pakeha is the Maori term for whites or Europeans. Some whites regard this
term as pejorative, while others use it as an acceptable synonym. In official sta-
tistics and reports European is used to describe white settlers and immigrants
and their descendants. Consistent with New Zealand journalism conventions, I
have used Pakeha and European interchangeably throughout the text and Euro-
pean in descriptive statistics. English translations of Maori words are from
Harawira and Karetu (1994).
2 The 1863 New Zealand Settlement Act was the first major legislation that
sanctioned compulsory land confiscation. As punishment for Maori fighting
against European settlement colonization in the 1860s, approximately 3.5 mil-
lion acres were taken from Maori as a prize of war. From 1905 onward Maori
Land Boards were authorized to compulsorily acquire land declared not required
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for actual occupation by Maori. Between 1865 and 1899, approximately 11 mil-
lion acres of Maori land were transferred to European hands under the land
laws, leaving approximately 8 million acres in Maori freehold ownership.
Between 1900 and 1930 another 4.5 million acres of Maori land were alienated
and a further 3 million acres were leased. In a 1920 survey, it was estimated that
400,000 acres were occupied by Maori and 800,000 acres were available for
Maori use (Ward 1997). Although government decision makers slowed the pace
of land confiscations by enacting the 1929 Native Land Amendment Act and
Native Land Claims Act, these acts were reversed by the 1953 Maori Affairs Act.
Under that act, any interested person could submit information to the Maori
Land Court claiming a particular parcel of land was unproductive (or had nox-
ious weeds or unpaid rates). The act also empowered Maori trustees, who could
alienate Maori-held lands by leasing or selling them as they saw fit. The 1953
Town and Country Planning Act restricted the use of Maori-held lands via zon-
ing laws.
3 Nga Tamatoa defined a system of “ethnic nationalism” by ascribing a
“black” identity and consciousness drawn from the writings of Franz Fannon,
Charles Hamilton, and Stokeley Carmichael. This new identity proclaimed the
unique political capacity of Maori culture as the basis for self-determination.
Maori ethnicity emerged as the key weapon to counter the prevailing ideologies
and resolve grievances over the loss of language, land, and power (Greenland
1991, 91).
4 The operative meaning of Maori sovereignty remains an unsettled question
within both Maoridom and New Zealand society. For comprehensive discussion
see Awatere (1984); Cox (1993); McHugh (1991); Sharp (1991).
5 The power to report on the consistency of proposed legislation with treaty
provisions has never been exercised, and can only be invoked by reference from
Parliament itself. So far this has never been done.
6 Only an approximate count is available at this time. Increasingly, related
main and smaller ancillary treaty claims are amalgamated in order to facilitate
adjudication. For example, the Ngai Tahu claim included 8 related major claims
and 117 small ancillary claims.
7 The South Island claims include the Otakou, Banks Peninsula, Murihiku,
North Canterbury, Rakiura, and Arahura purchases; perpetual leases of Ngai
Tahu reserves; and mahinga kai (food resources).
8 Several distinct Asian ethnic groups are resident in New Zealand. Many
immigrated from Korea, Japan, Hong Kong, Malaysia, South Africa, and Fiji in
the 1980s; some are refugees from Cambodia, Vietnam, and Thailand who
immigrated in the 1970s; and others are second and third generation Chinese.
Census data on the “Asian” populations are not recorded consistently over time.
In some years the data are pooled with “all other” groups, and in other years
they are disaggregated into Chinese and Indian. Also, approximately 4.4 percent
of the population did not specify their ethnicity in the 1996 census.
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9 Data on labor force participation, occupations, and unemployment are not
disaggregated for each ethnic group over the entire period of study. Until 1986
data are disaggregated only as Maori and European. Data for Pacific Islanders
and Asians are enumerated from 1987 onward.
10 Unlike the United States, where the educational premium is high and
allegedly contributes to labor market segmentation, in New Zealand the returns
to higher education remain small across all groups until 1986 (Lashley 1999).
According to New Zealand historians Claudia Orange and Willima Oliver, the
working class majority did not define education as indispensable to achieving a
good and comfortable quality of life. New Zealanders deemed formal education
neither instrumental to wealth accumulation nor economic and social well-being,
and the premium paid for higher education was small until the mid-1980s. Work
tended to be compensated equally, given stringent union regulation enforced by
the social democratic compact between the government, employers, and workers
(Oliver 1994; Orange 1994). In a study of Maori occupational segregation, 1956
to 1981, Brosnan redefined the occupational code (from two to four digits, with
“manual workers” partitioned as unskilled and skilled) and found the ratio of
unskilled to skilled manual workers was 3:1 for Maori and 0.9:1 for Europeans
(1986). Maori also had lower median incomes, given concentration in unskilled
work, but there was no evidence of either a dual labor market (in which Maori
earn lower wages than Europeans in the same skill code for the same work) or
labor market segmentation.
11 Brian Easton also found some evidence of labor market segmentation
emerging in his analysis of 1993 household labor force data on Maori employ-
ment (1994). In a recent study of family incomes in 1981 and 1991, Barry Mar-
tin found “restructuring altered income relativities between family types and
between ethnic groups. The relative position of male sole parents and Maori and
Pacific Islanders has deteriorated . . . the freeing up of pay relativities, and the
rapid rise of unemployment in the late 1980s have not struck families equally”
(1995).
12 Urban Maori authorities are members of the Federation of Maori Author-
ities, a network of Maori organizations that foster and promote development,
management, and economic advancement for Maori. These include tribal trust
boards, land trusts, economic authorities, and other entities.
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Abstract
This study examines treaty settlement as a mechanism for providing social jus-
tice and incorporating Maori people into mainstream New Zealand society by
improving economic and social well-being. Articles II and III of the Treaty of
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Waitangi (respectively, collectively held private assets and citizenship benefits
and privileges) are described and discussed, along with settlement of claims of
breached treaty rights, social policy targeted to Maori, and changes in economic
and social well-being from 1976 to 1998. The fundamental proposition is that
all Maori are harmed by the legacy of dispossession and marginalization and,
therefore, all Maori are entitled to social justice. The central question addresses
the role of the state in providing redress to all indigenous New Zealanders, col-
lectives and individuals, for breaches of both Article II and Article III treaty
rights. However, urbanization and detribalization limit access to social justice,
and the benefits of treaty settlements have yet to trickle down to individual
Maori households. Changes in aggregate indicators of well-being indicate mod-
est improvement in the first decade, and thereafter Maori people experience
greater and increasing income inequality, unemployment, and poverty than other
population subgroups. To explain these findings, the following questions are
addressed: What is the relationship between detribalization and access to treaty
settlement assets? What strategies should the government undertake to provide
redress (to individual Maori as well as tribal collectives) for breaches of Article
III treaty rights?
keywords: detribalization, Maori, New Zealand social policy, social justice,
treaty settlement, Waitangi
